Introduction
With the development of internet technology and e-commerce, electronic cash system is becoming an increasingly important payment method in modern life. The main objective of e-cash is to construct an off-line fair multi-bank system. Besides, how to operate the system efficiently for quick payment and prevent the system vulnerabilities like falsification of information, double-spending and money-tampering are the development bottleneck and hot research area of the e-cash system. E-cash system is mainly founded by cryptographic protocols. Digital signature provides technical support and guarantee for the system. The key to construct efficient and secure e-cash system is the well-designed cryptographic protocols. The cryptographic protocols should be computationally efficient and could realize the practicality of e-cash system.
The first e-cash system is proposed by David Chaum in 1982 using group blind signature [1] . Since then various e-cash systems were proposed with different digital signature schemes. The famous ACJT group signature [2] scheme was put forward in 2000 [3] . After that, e-cash system based on group signature had a fully development. With the good properties such as anonymity, revocable anonymity, unlinkability, and unforgeability of group signature, the practical and provable secure ACJT scheme is widely used in e-cash system and other areas. There are lots of e-cash systems based on ACJT group signature were presented such as [4] - [8] . However, they all have some shortcomings. For example, some of them are inefficient and couldn't prevent money-tampering. How to construct an efficient and secure e-cash system based on group signature is still the research hotspot.
The security and efficiency of e-cash system are rely mainly on the digital signature. In order to construct a better system, we should improve the signature scheme used in it.
Efficient Certificateless Group Signature Scheme
Our group signature scheme comprises the following steps: setup, group manager and group member's partial key extraction, member joining, signing, verifying, opening, updating and member revocation.
The scheme consists three main bodies: key generation center KGC, group manager GM and group member A.
The specific processes are as follows: F E F q P P H .
Partial key extraction for group manager GM
The partial key of group manager GM is generated by KGC. Let
GM

ID
be the identity information of GM. The interaction between KGC and GM is as follows:
①GM chooses his secret value 
Member Joining
If a member A wants to join the group, GM would generate validity duration of signature T for A. We suppose that the current time period is i . The interaction between GM and A follows these steps:
①A first chooses 
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Verification
The verifier should calculates 
And he accepts the signature if and only if ' cc  .
We named this process as ()
A
Verify m .
Opening
by his partial key and prove that ' , , 2
We named this process as () Open A .
Updating
When the system gets into the period (i+1) from period i, A would update his sign key by the following steps:
①A computes
②GM updates the member information he stored before to , 1
 . We named this process as () Update A .
Member revocation
If a member A in period j need to be revoked, GM and KGC would update their We named this process as Re ( ) voke A .
There are two figures in our group signature scheme. The first one is the member joining process and the second one is the signing and verifying process. Member joining 
Figure 1. Member Joining
Signing and verification
Fair off-line Multi-bank e-cash System
Our e-cash system is constructed on the basis of the new group signature scheme. The specific processes are as follows:
This e-cash system consists of two groups: ① 
ID PK Y E e h s .
Withdrawal Protocol
In this process, i U would contact with the bank again. For the sake of preventing user's extortion or deceitful actions, the information of users needs to be verified again.
i U would make a group signature for denomination m. 
Tracing Protocol
If there was one verification of the transaction failed, the merchants or branches could send Bi PK in member information to the central bank B . Then B would trace the corresponding issuing bank and the issuing bank could open user's identity by his group signature. Finally, the issuing bank would mark the e-cash and put it in the illegal e-cash library. Besides, the issuing bank wouldn't deduct m in user's account.
Design Principles
In this paper, we combine the group signature with e-cash in order to present an efficient and secure system. By analyses of improvement measures, we proposed a new group signature scheme and applied it to the design of e-cash system. This group signature scheme has the following features:
① The scheme has established an elliptic curve model and has chosen specific elliptic curves. We operate this scheme using point multiplication and addition in elliptic curves thanks to the efficiency. Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is more complex than standard discrete logarithm problem. Based on the known solutions of encryption, the security of 160-bit elliptic curve cryptography is equal to the 1024-bit RSA. That's why ECC can achieve high security with short key length. The new scheme in this paper uses different parameters. Compared to ACJT which has complex modular multiplication, exponentiation and large computation, our scheme has less parameters, shorter signature length and could be operated in a shorter time. Table 1 is a comparison between ACJT and our scheme. ② In order to simplify the member joining process, we apply certificateless signature into group signature and design a certificateless signature member joining algorithm. As a result, group member A doesn't need to face certificate distribution problem and key escrow problem when he joins the group. At the beginning of the member joining process, A generates a signature with his partial key and sends it to group manager GM, resulting 
to GM. GM gets public key of A from KGC rather than A, and then verifies the signature sent by A before. This algorithm proves the validity of A's identity and could resist against public key substitution attack. After the verification process, GM sends A his certificate. ③ Our scheme provides forward security, so the scheme could avoid key exposure attack and is more secure than the others. In this scheme, we divide the system time into segments. In certain time period i, A's sign key , Ai x can be updated by requires finding the r-th root module q-1. The difficulty of this problem is equal to the factorization. Hence, the update algorithm is secure. All the sign public key, member certificate and member signature would be updated with the sign key. This update algorithm leads to renew of the system information and doesn't increase the computation. It also helps to keep the stability and reduce the burden of the system. We put the time period i into the signature 
Ai c s s s s T T i , so the signature has real time ability
and is easy to verify. ④ Our scheme has the member revocation algorithm, while ACJT has not. In our scheme, KGC and GM revoke group members by keeping some member revocation lists. The member information renews with time, and thus the information stored in KGC and GM would also change. If A needs to be revoked at some period, KGC and GM would store A's information into the corresponding revocation lists. It is convenient for KGC and GM to verify the identity of A later. At the same time, GM would publish a revocation list which covers A's partial information. The verifier could prove the validity of A's identity through the public revocation list. This revocation algorithm has only simple computation, thus increases the system efficiency.
Scheme Analyses
This section is mainly about the security and efficiency analyses of group signature scheme and e-cash system.
Group Signature Scheme Analysis
This section aims to analyse the security and efficiency of our group signature scheme. Security analysis is mainly about unforgeability and forward security. The efficiency analysis of our scheme is concluded from comparing with other schemes.
Unforgeability
There are two types of adversaries in certificateless signature. We named them adversary Ⅰ and adversary Ⅱ. Type Ⅰ attack is the public key substitution attack. Type Ⅱ attack is the malicious KGC attack.
Type Ⅰ attack
An adversary A 1 has access to the system information except for member A's secret 
. Hence, the type Ⅰ attack is unsuccessful. Our scheme could avoid the Type Ⅰ attack.
Type Ⅱ attack
An adversary A 2 may have access to the system master key of KGC, but he couldn't replace member A's partial public key. A 2 may forge some information of A and generate some encrypted texts. It is unsuccessful. We prove it as follows: 
Thus, the type Ⅱ attack is unsuccessful. Our scheme could avoid the Type Ⅱ attack.
Forward Security
During the updating process, all the public key, member certificate and signature change with A's sign key. The system information renews in different time and the update algorithm doesn't increase the system computation. Besides, the signature of former time periods would still be valid after the member revocation. As a consequence, our scheme provides forward security. Suppose that member A is in period j and his sign key is 
Efficiency Analysis
The proposed scheme is constructed on elliptic curve model. It achieves high security with shorter key length. It is known that the security of 160-bit ECC is equal to that of 1024-bit RSA.
The computation complexity of modular multiplication and exponentiation in finite fields is high. The low computation cost algorithms like addition in finite fields could be ignored. We estimate the scheme by high computation cost algorithms. Table 2 is the performance comparison among our scheme, ACJT [3] , Song et al.'s scheme [9] and Shi et al.'s scheme [20] . T stands for the number of system time periods. k stands for the number of revoked members. "╳" stands for the lack of the process. "√" stands for the possession of the process. Suppose that the element size in finite field G is 1024 bits, the element size in ECC is 160 bits and the time length is 16 bits.
According to the method used in [26] , we suppose our CPU is 1.6GHz and RAM is 2.0G. The language we used is C++. We need 1910ms to finish the exponent operation in average. It costs 1.49ms to realize the point multiplication in groups with 160-bit key length. Deducing from the computation, we conclude that the total time of signing, verifying and opening processes in ACJT [3] , Song [9] , Shi [20] are respectively 45840ms, (84080+1910k) ms and 45840ms while our scheme only needs 43.21ms. It is clear that our scheme has high efficiency.
No Money-tampering and Double-spending
In the withdrawal process, the issuing bank distributes e-cash which contains denomination, e-cash number and the verification signature generated by itself. For the sake of judging whether the user has tampered money or spent money for many times, the verifier could verify the information in e-cash or e-cash libraries. In the interaction process between users and merchants, the merchants would generate a transaction time named pay-time. Pay-time is another mark of e-cash. One can check whether there exists a repeat transaction time to verify the double-spending actions. This e-cash system is constructed on the basis of our new group signature scheme. It has high security and efficiency. By comparison, our system founded an elliptic curve model and the modulus size is ≥160 bits while other systems are ≥1024 bits. We realize high security with shorter key length. There is a member revocation algorithm in our system. Group members could join and revoke from the group freely. Our system also provides forward security. The member information updates with time and thus avoids the key exposure attack. It makes the system more secure. For the sake of preventing cyber crime, we design a new algorithm and the system could avoid money-tampering and double-spending actions etc..
Performance Comparison
Conclusion
In order to improve the efficiency of e-cash system to achieve quick payment and avoid cyber-crime like forge of information, double-spending and money-tampering, we combine group signature with e-cash system. In this paper, we construct a new e-cash system based on an efficient and secure group signature scheme. The security and efficiency are enhanced compared with the other systems. Besides, we prove that our system could prevent forge of information, double-spending and money-tampering Our new group signature scheme is designed based on the fact that solving the ECDLP is harder than DLP. We establish an elliptic curve model and choose the specific elliptic curves. The whole scheme is operated by using point multiplication and addition in elliptic curves. Our scheme has lower computation complexity compared to modular multiplication and exponentiation in finite fields used in ACJT. We have less parameters, and the signature length is reduced by 86.13%. The main processes in our scheme cost only ≥40ms while ACJT cost ≥40000ms. Therefore, our scheme is more efficient. We realize a system of high security with shorter key length. We also apply the certificateless signature into our group signature scheme. We design a new member joining algorithm used certificateless signature. In this process, members generate a signature directly using their partial key extracted from KGC, and then the group manager GM verifies them, which reduces the interactions between members and GM and simplifies the member joining process. Also, it decreases the storage pressure of GM. The scheme has strong exculpability and could avoid the combined attacks. In our scheme, member's sign key changes with time through the update algorithm. This provides forward security and prevents the key exposure attacks. There also exists a member revocation algorithm in our scheme, which makes our scheme more practical compared to ACJT without this function. Our scheme proves to be secure and efficient over the other schemes.
